



Expertise and the Supreme Court:                           
What is the Problem?  
Ronald J. Allen∗ 
Much to my delight, having actually quite enjoyed my legal 
education, I have been called on by a law professor for the first time 
since law school to express my understanding of an important legal 
issue.  Unlike days of yore when students went to class at their peril, 
never knowing if that was their fateful day, I was given much advance 
notice by the professor.  Quite like days of yore, by contrast, this 
particular professor may be the world’s leading expert in the 
question posed, and thus in the grand tradition of law students I am 
at risk of saying silly things that will quickly be exposed as such.  
Professor Risinger has directed me to address the related questions of 
how federal courts are now to “approach formulating the issue to 
which reliability criteria are to be applied,” and whether “in a 
fundamental way how to frame the question is as important a part of 
proper evaluation of expert reliability as the criteria to be applied in 
order to arrive at an answer.”1  Professor Risinger has given some 
considerable thought to these questions, as has Professor Moreno.2  
Guided by them, now, too, have I, although whether as usefully as 
they is surely problematic.  In what follows, I first provide some 
introductory perspectives on these interesting questions.  I then 
summarize Professors Risinger’s and Moreno’s assessments, and 
conclude with my own. 
Harkening back again to my days as a law student, I was once 
called on by the intimidating Professor Palmer to recite concerning a 
very complex case of restitution, of which I had only the vaguest 
comprehension.  I did know that the entire litigation, being over a 
total of $15, was a colossal waste of social resources, and perhaps 
 
 ∗ John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 1 Letter from Michael Risinger, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School 
of Law (May 20, 2002) (on file with author). 
 2 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic 
Science After Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000); see 
also Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans 
that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033 (2001). 
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thinking that by getting rid of the case I could get rid of my 
immediate problem, so informed him and the class that the case 
should have been dismissed on grounds of inconsequentiality.  
Professor Palmer, thinking the class was about restitution rather than 
social policy, asked me simply to confess to being unprepared the 
next time I was when called upon, thus preserving the social 
resources of the class, and went on to someone else. 
I have no doubt that, in a class on the law of restitution, 
Professor Palmer did the right thing.  I have considerable doubt, by 
contrast, that it is very useful to ask how to frame the issue to which 
reliability criteria are to be applied in the context of the Supreme 
Court cases, viewing the matter as internal to them.  This question 
arises in particular with respect to the relationship between Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael3 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4  I 
believe the import of the question is: How are we to apply the 
standards of Daubert, fashioned with respect to “science” that is fairly 
unproblematic in terms of its internal organization and criteria of 
validation, to the enormous range of issues that inhabit the 
countryside between the borders of accepted science with reasonably 
rigorous methods of validation and conventional knowledge that 
needs no special care and feeding?  That countryside is wild and 
unruly, involving all forms of knowledge and experience barely 
beyond what could reasonably be expected to be known or 
experienced by jurors that lack reliable means of validation akin to 
normal science. 
 To “apply” the standards of Daubert to this vast and forbidding 
landscape, as Kumho Tire directs, seems to result in a significant 
mismatch between tool and task.  Daubert was fashioned with normal 
science in mind and invokes standard criteria of scientific validation, 
such as controlled studies and the like.  The very essence of the 
untamed land leading from there to conventional knowledge is that 
its inhabitants cannot be domesticated by such tools; otherwise there 
would be no problem.  So, basically, the Supreme Court has 
instructed the lower courts to apply standards that simply do not 
apply.  Thus, Professor Risinger’s question to me: how do we go 
about specifying the criteria that will satisfy Kumho Tire’s demand? 
As plainly the answer does not reside in the formal relationship 
between Daubert and Kumho Tire, the answer must come instead from 
an analysis of the system as a whole.  The real question being asked is 
how expert testimony fits into the administration of justice more 
 
 3 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 4 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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generally.  The answer to that question is informed by the central 
concern of the Supreme Court cases—verifiable reliability of 
evidence—but it is informed by much more. 
Consider briefly how much more.  Reliability is itself not 
anyone’s ultimate goal; it is instead instrumental to accurate 
adjudication.  But accurate adjudication is not the only star in the 
firmament in many people’s eyes.  It competes with notions of 
fairness, and the two can be at odds.5  Fairness, in turn, can have 
many meanings that again can be in tension, such as dignity and 
autonomy, and the whole ball of fairness wax can itself be in conflict 
with the goal of wealth redistribution (or an elaboration on it). 
To make matters more complex still, there may be what I will 
refer to as technical desiderata apart from the grand issues of fairness 
and the like—matters internal to the legal system that bear upon this 
question.  An obvious candidate is the set of constraints on the 
government in criminal cases that perhaps should impose higher 
evidentiary burdens on the government than in civil cases, or more 
generally whether civil and criminal cases pose different problems.6  
Others are conventional and traditional modes of proceeding, such 
as, in no particular order, party control of litigation, adversarial 
presentation, historic and constitutional role of juries, role and 
obligations of trial judges (such as preserve resources, in addition to 
facilitating fairness and accuracy).  Resting somewhat uneasily beside 
all this is a conception of procedural rules, including rules of 
admissibility, as incentive devices to promote or discourage certain 
types of behavior, and of course which behavior is to be encouraged 
or suppressed may itself be an object of dispute.7  Expert testimony is 
a critical component of the administration of justice that touches 
directly all these issues; it is both a constituent of them and 
determined by them.  That is why the question Professor Risinger has 
both studied and propounded to me is so critical, and at the same 
time, so difficult. 
I suspect it is in part the influence of the more general issue of 
 
 5 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is a good example of the conflicts 
between differing conceptions of fairness, as the aftermath of Faretta played out the 
distinction between dignity and autonomy.  See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 
(1984). 
 6 See Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The 
“Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 877 (1994); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert 
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 
100-02 (2000). 
 7 Compare, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990), with Daniel R. Fischel, 
Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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the nature of the administration of justice that causes much of the 
consternation about expert testimony, and that makes what might 
otherwise be quite straightforward issues contentious and complex.  
Differential rules of admissibility are justifiable if tort is seen as 
compensatory or wealth redistributive rather than if it is seen as 
designed to reduce the total cost of accidents,8 if one views the 
government skeptically or not in criminal cases, and so on.  For 
example, if handwriting analysis were limited to civil cases, I doubt 
the academy would have gotten up in arms over its admissibility.  
Instead, it is often critical testimony in criminal trials, and thus affects 
the ease with which criminal convictions may be obtained.  If 
prosecutors proffered some of the evidence proffered by civil 
plaintiffs to establish physical causation in some toxic torts, such as in 
the bendictin or parlodel litigation, the academy most likely would 
have been up in arms again.  When the underlying issue shifts from 
criminal responsibility to wealth redistribution, so, too, may one’s 
view of the matter, and so on.  Thus, to answer what the proper 
question is concerning the admissibility of expert evidence entails a 
prior view of the proper role of litigation.9 
Over the questions of the goals and purposes of the legal system, 
there is much disagreement.  Ideological battles over the nature of 
the criminal process are a stable part of the legal landscape,10 as are 
disagreements about the teleology of the civil justice system.11  I doubt 
that any general, useful, and uncontroversial propositions about the 
conditions of admissibility of expert testimony can be formulated 
without resolutions of these disagreements, and that is a task that 
exceeds my meager abilities.  Here I can only note that to answer 
Professor Risinger’s question fully will require resolution of the larger 
issues.  As I predict that resolution will not be forthcoming quickly, I 
further predict that neither will a definitive resolution of Professor 
Risinger’s question. 
Given the intractability of a definitive resolution of the question, 
it must be approached instead in light of simplifying assumptions.  
The one I make here is that the litigation process is largely designed 
to yield accurate results—naive realism to the max, in other words.  
 
 8 This is the standard debate over the meaning of negligence. 
 9 See Risinger, supra note 6. 
 10 See, e.g., RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21-70 
(2001). 
 11 As the disagreement between the economics and the moralists about the 
nature of tort liability indicates.  For a discussion, see Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. 
Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and 
Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683 (2002). 
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This entails complicated, complex, and controversial matters,12 but I 
put all that aside ex hypothesi.  On the assumption, then, that the rules 
governing the admissibility of expert testimony emanating from the 
Supreme Court cases are designed to advance accurate adjudication, 
what would they look like? 
I believe that the individuals who have looked most closely at the 
issue are in agreement as to one significant aspect of those rules, and, 
if I read them correctly, both approve of it.  Relying on explicit 
language of the Court,13 both Professors Moreno and Risinger have 
concluded that the Kumho Tire opinion moves district court 
consideration from what they call global appraisals of reliability of 
evidence to contextualized appraisals, and there is much to support 
this proposition in the Court’s opinion and in the lower court 
decisions following in its wake.14  Moreno and Risinger are correct at 
least in part that the explicit language of the Court seems to have the 
implication they identify, and for very good reason.  Simply put, no 
matter how well credentialed and conversant in an established field, 
an expert may still testify to falsehoods.  These falsehoods may involve 
generalities of the substantive content of the relevant field or its 
methodology, or as either applies to the particular facts of the case at 
hand.  Focusing attention on the field and the witness’s credentials to 
the exclusion of the testimony in context risks encouraging abusive 
expert testimony practices—the now legendary junk science.  Thus, 
the district judge must determine that the testimony is relevant to the 
task at hand in a localized rather than a global fashion, where that 
means that the expert is testifying on the basis of knowledge applied 
to the facts in a reliable manner. 
 
 12 See, e.g., Mike McConville & Roger Leng, Editorial, 1 INT’L. J. EVID. & PROOF 253 
(1997) (explaining that the special issue of the journal is structured as a “debate” of 
various complex matters all within a naive realist metaphysics and epistemology). 
 13 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153-56. 
 14 Moreno, supra note 2, at 1055.  Daubert refocused “the admissibility inquiry to 
emphasize relevance and eliminate or diminish the Court’s inquiry into more 
general questions of scientific reliability/validity.”  Id. at 1054.  Furthermore, “what is 
clearly not consistent with Kumho Tire is any attempt to approach an issue of 
reliability globally.”  Risinger, supra note 2, at 773. 
I take it to be obvious that I am using “reliable” to refer to evidence that is 
creditable, and not in its non-legal technical sense that distinguishes it from validity.  
Although much has been made of the Supreme Court’s butchering of these terms in 
Daubert, in fact the technical distinction between reliability and validity does not map 
directly onto the legal system.  Both matter, but the question for the legal system is 
whether evidence increases the probability of an accurate outcome for rational 
reasons.  As I will return to later in this paper, much of the difficulty over expert 
testimony comes from it leading wherever it does, including to accurate outcomes, 
for reasons that could not be described as rational. 
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I say Moreno and Risinger are right in part that these decisions 
are now to be made locally rather than globally.  The constraint is 
that expert testimony cannot advance accurate outcomes locally 
unless it rests on acceptable epistemological warrant globally.  A 
necessary but not sufficient condition of appropriate testimony 
“locally” is reliable expertise “globally.”  The testimony at trial must 
rest on something, obviously, and that “something” must be true, 
whether it is the accumulated experience of an individual accurately 
summarized or knowledge of highly systematic disciplines.  That 
global reliability is not sufficient to ensure local reliability is precisely 
why Kumho was decided as it was, but Kumho cannot also stand for the 
proposition that global reliability is not a necessary element.  Without 
global reliability, one has gibberish.  Thus, the logical relationships 
underlying the Supreme Court’s cases require that both the global 
and the local issues be resolved favorably before an expert should be 
allowed to testify.  As Risinger points out, astrologers may or may not 
be quite reliable in their testimony, now using the term “reliable” in 
its normal scientific sense of procedures reaching consistent results; it 
is the lack of validity—an underlying verifiable factual basis—to 
astrology that results in its exclusion at trial.15 
It appears to me that the move to the local in Kumho was driven 
purely by the Supreme Court’s recognition that, no matter how well 
established a field is, an expert could still testify to complete junk 
unless the actual relationship between the testimony and the field is 
assessed and found sufficient.  Thus, I do not think that Kumho so 
much changed the question emanating from Daubert as it added 
another layer to it; henceforth in every case district judges must 
determine that a proffered witness both possesses and is 
appropriately applying an expertise, which require that there be in 
fact an expertise.  In fact, I would go further and say that this 
addition was a perfectly predictable and plainly necessary 
emendation on Daubert.16  Thus, to the extent that my assignment was 
 
 15 Professor Risinger puts this in terms of a rejection of astrologers’ “methods of 
conclusion.”  Risinger, supra note 2, at 776.  I think what he is saying here is that 
astrology is superstition, not science, and we know that because we have very good 
warrant to believe that we live in a physically causal universe, where it is intentionality 
of minds rather than the motions of planets that causes people to behave as they do.  
That this is Professor Risinger’s view is clarified in D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary 
Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 508, 524 n.28 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Functional Taxonomy], pointing 
out that “there is no replicated and statistically significant evidence that astrologers 
can predict the future.”  That is a global assessment, of course. 
 16 Professor Risinger may disagree with this.  See Risinger, supra note 2, at 
782(criticizing a lower court that had taken a “global” position on document 
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motivated in part by the possibility that Kumho sent the expert 
testimony process in a new direction from that of Daubert, the answer 
to what question is to be asked of the expert post-Kumho is precisely 
whatever questions should have been asked post- (and for that matter 
pre-) Daubert, to-wit: Does the expert in fact possess knowledge useful 
to this trial that is being brought to bear upon it in a way that 
increases the probability of accurate outcomes?  That Kumho dealt 
with purported expertise outside of the range of conventional 
scientific inquiry was just a happenstance from this perspective.17  
Before long a “normal science” case would have come along with a 
well-credentialed expert willing to offer testimony that overleaped the 
expert’s knowledge or data, and the Court would have disapproved of 
it.  The Court just simply killed two birds with the Kumho stone by 
clarifying the reach of FRE 702 and that junk science cannot be 
presented by real scientists or other experts willing to violate their 
oaths.18 
At this level, then, the only point of interest that comes from 
analyzing Professor Risinger’s assignment to address how the lower 
courts are to “approach formulating the issue to which reliability 
criteria are to be applied” is perhaps that the dustup over what Kumho 
Tire did to Daubert was largely beside the point.  Kumho Tire merely 
applied Daubert in the only way (that I can see at any rate) that makes 
sense, if accurate adjudication is the desideratum. 
There is a second aspect to this assignment, though.  Even if 
there is not a “global” change from Daubert to Kumho with respect to 
the conditions of admissibility of expertise, still Kumho did clarify that 
FRE 702 applies in some fashion to expertise from fields that lack the 
epistemological warrant of much modern science, with its controlled 
 
examination).  He wrote, “[t]his unanalyzed global approach is now clearly 
unavailable after Kumho Tire.”  Id.  It is only unavailable as a sufficient condition of 
admissibility; it is plainly necessary. 
 17 It was not a happenstance for the question of the scope of Daubert, of course. 
 18 Professor Risinger makes a tantalizing allusion to this position when he says of 
the expert in Kumho Tire that “[s]ubstantial experience of relevant similarity to what 
is at issue in the case at hand is a necessary condition for the reliability of experience-
based expertise, but in most contexts it is not a sufficient condition to establish 
reliability.”  Risinger, supra note 2 at 775.  He does not develop further the 
relationship between necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Similarly, Professor Moreno at one point says: “judges must work to uncover 
mistakes in both the scientific methodology and its application to the particular facts 
of a case.”  Moreno, supra note 2, at 1071.  I am unsure how these points relate to 
both authors’ emphasis on the local.  In any event, the thesis of this Article is that the 
relationship between necessary and sufficient conditions is the key to understanding 
the conditions of admissibility of expert testimony, which in turn requires both 
“global” validity and “local” reliability (in evidentiary terms). 
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studies, peer review, and the like.  Can anything systematical be said 
about the conditions of admissibility of the many different kinds or 
forms of expert knowledge that reside in the landscape ranging from 
Daubert to Kumho?  Again, Professor Risinger is leading the way in this 
regard.  In an important article, he has sketched out a preliminary 
functional taxonomy of expertise in which he usefully distinguishes 
between experts who will or can educate the fact finder as to the 
underlying discipline, thus putting the fact finder in a position 
rationally to appraise the evidence, and what he calls “translational” 
experts, which are those who will provide opinions about the 
evidence to which fact finders can defer.19  He further provides an 
insightful analysis of translational expertise, highlighting the various 
ways in which it can go wrong, thus highlighting the hurdles that 
judges should impose before admitting evidence of this sort.  Perhaps 
part of his assignment to me included developing further this 
taxonomy. 
But I demur, although not out of disrespect.  Quite the opposite, 
in fact, because I think he has said all there is to say about the matter, 
and has given detailed, useful examples.  All that remains to be done 
is to apply his central point to the myriad cases of expertise that will 
arise, which will happen, appropriately, in a common-law fashion 
over time. 
What, then, has he said?  His basic point is that judges must be 
convinced that an expert is testifying on the basis of knowledge 
rather than caprice, superstition, or whatever, but that the basis of 
that demonstration will vary over the discipline in question.  Precisely 
so.  To translate this into my own terms, he has taken the distinction 
that Joe Miller and I advanced between educating the fact finder and 
providing an opinion to which it can defer and applied it to the judge 
in its role of determining the admissibility of evidence.20  This is a 
powerful point, and one that I wish I had thought of myself.  
Professor Risinger also reaches a position analogous to the 
conclusion of our previous work that the judge must, in fact, be 
educated about the basis of the expert’s opinion, and conclude that it 
is rational and warranted, before admitting it at trial.  Again, precisely 
so.  I would add to it only one further step.  If the trial judge is 
rationally convinced that an expert is testifying on the basis of 
reliable expertise, then the trial judge has been sufficiently educated 
 
 19 Risinger, Functional Taxonomy, supra note 15. 
 20 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference 
or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993); see also Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the 
Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157 (1994). 
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in the discipline to follow and appraise the progression of the 
expert’s thought.  If such education is possible, then circular “general 
acceptance” reasoning standing alone is not necessary and should be 
insufficient, as it is the reason for general acceptance that matters.  
General acceptance may be a useful confirmatory signal, but little 
more than that. 
Combining Professor Risinger’s insight with our previous work 
on the education-deference divide leads to an unexpected 
implication, however.  If the trial judge must be educated about the 
underlying basis of an expert’s opinion, and can follow the reasoning 
process of the expert, then whatever is presented to the trial judge 
can be presented to the jury if there is one.  Thus, there is no need to 
permit expert opinion testimony devoid of the underlying basis that 
permits the opinion to be rationally processed and analyzed by the 
fact finder.21  Whether a jury understands is a different matter, but it 
is hardly a serious argument for not providing a jury the basis of an 
expert’s testimony that possibly the jury will not understand it.  Quite 
the contrary, such a risk should inform what the party must present 
to the fact finder.22 
There is, then, a general rule that emerges from all this, which is 
that parties must educate trial judge and fact finder about the 
relevant matters, just as they must with respect to everything else at 
trial, and in terms processable by judge and juror.  The specifics of 
this will vary from discipline to discipline, whether practical or 
academic, but in all instances the same question should asked: Has 
the proponent of the evidence explained it sufficiently so that it can 
be understood and processed rationally? 
Should we hold open the possibility that there is some 
experiential expertise that may defy easy articulation in the terms I 
am proposing here?  Chicken sexers, for example, who apparently 
can only learn their trade through trial and error and cannot 
articulate the basis of their decisions?23  Still, the results of chicken 
sexers are verifiable, and thus the reliability of chicken sexers can be 
tested.  Similarly, individuals testifying from other forms of 
experience will rarely if ever be unique and their testimony can be 
systematically compared with opposing views and the like.  The 
answer to whether there is any form of evidence not subject to this 
 
 21 Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly allow such.  See Allen & 
Miller, supra note 20. 
 22 If the fact finder cannot be educated about a matter, it is not something that 
ought to be decided by judicial process precisely to the extent accurate adjudication 
is the goal. 
 23 See generally R.D. MARTIN, THE SPECIALIST CHICK SEXER (1994). 
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analysis will have to emerge over time, but my present view is that a 
person who cannot explain the basis of testimony in an accessible 
fashion or explain how it can be verified ought not be allowed to 
testify.  This will increase, in some instances remarkably, the difficulty 
of securing the admission of some evidence, but allowing testimony 
without such a foundation changes the nature of trials from rational 
deliberation on the evidence to irrational deference to unjustified 
opinions.  Modern fact finders are sufficiently enlightened, and 
modern courts have adequate tools, to make such deference a thing 
of the past and by doing so advance trials as rational, deliberate 
events. 
Interestingly, the answer to the second part of this inquiry may 
resuscitate the global/local distinction, but with a twist.  When I say 
that it is necessary to establish the “global” issue of reliability, I am 
merely saying that virtually all trial testimony will be embedded in or 
a part of some larger body of knowledge, and that the reliability of 
the testimony will depend in part on the reliability of the inferentially 
prior propositions or methodologies involved.24  Still, almost surely no 
trial testimony will depend in any direct or critical sense on all 
propositions or methods associated with a particular body of 
knowledge, and there is little justification for expending trial related 
resources to explain to judges and jurors largely irrelevant aspects of 
some body of knowledge.  In this sense, Professors Risinger and 
Moreno are correct again that the Court has directed the trial process 
away from a global inquiry into the epistemology of various fields of 
knowledge.  Still, just as no trial testimony is likely to invoke all 
epistemological aspects of a discipline, so too is it unlikely that trial 
testimony would ever fail to rely on some aspects of a field’s 
epistemology.  The task at trial thus can be limited to establishing the 
validity of whatever is necessary for the testimony. 
What will be necessary for the testimony will in turn be 
idiosyncratic to the case.  Certain foundational propositions of 
various fields will need to be addressed, and why they are accepted as 
true established.  Some methodological issues will need to be 
addressed from time to time, basic statistical methods for example.  
The precise contours of the necessary background will depend on the 
precise testimony directly relevant to the case that is being proffered.  
In this different sense, Kumho Tire did direct a “local” inquiry, but not 
one that foregoes the foundations of the bodies of knowledge 
 
 24 I suspect that this is true of all testimony, actually.  Eyewitness testimony, for 
example, depends upon assumptions about perception, memory, and narrative 
ability. 
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relevant to trials.  Rather, it directs presentation of the necessary 
components of that foundation to the trial judge so that the trial 
testimony can be understood and processed rationally.25 
Perhaps this concludes things rather with a whimper than a 
bang, for it amounts to saying that trial judges must do whatever 
needs to be done in order to ensure that reliable evidence is 
presented at trial, but what “needs to be done” cannot be further 
specified.  I see no alternative to wimping-out on this one, though.  
While I laud Professor Risinger’s preliminary efforts to articulate a 
taxonomy of expert testimony, I do not think he or anyone else will 
succeed in reducing the field to a set of rules containing necessary 
and sufficient conditions.  The field of potential expertise is vast—
which is precisely why I received this assignment to try to bring order 
to it—but sprawling and unpredictable phenomena cannot easily be 
regulated acceptably by rules.26  The rules invariably turn out to be 
too broad or too narrow.  In such instances, there is no substitute for 
substantive engagement with the relevant questions—learning 
enough about the field to make reasonable judgments, in other 
words.  In the best Edisonian tradition, more than inspiration, the 
field of expert testimony calls for good old fashioned perspiration.27 
The substantive engagement with fields will surely be assisted by 
instruction in the forms of knowledge and methodological 
approaches, to be sure, and sometimes it will amount to little more 
than doing individualized validity testing of proffered witnesses.28  
There is no good reason to attempt to specify in advance what this 
might entail, as the great diversity as to what uncontroversially counts 
as “science” attests.  The criteria for validation in particle physics, 
astronomy, and genetics differ markedly, and bear only a fortuitous 
or casual relationship to the Daubert criteria, yet all are sciences.  
Experiential expertise, beside the point that it should be replicable or 
testable in some fashion, will sprawl even more widely over the 
 
 25 I suspect that this is what all the judges who are now saying that the task is not 
to judge expert testimony in the “abstract” have in mind.  See, e.g., Moreno, supra 
note 2, at 1057 (noting the trial judge’s admonition, in National Football League 
Properties, Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665, 672 (E.D. Wis. 1999), that non-case-
specific evidence, by itself, does not sufficiently assist jurors to warrant admission). 
 26 For discussions of this phenomenon, see Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 11.  See 
also Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
 27 See generally Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence 
of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 239 (2000). 
 28 See Risinger, Functional Taxonomy, supra note 15, at 522, 525.  If the question 
were whether a bloodhound had lost its nose, no one would object to a test, I 
suspect.  Experiential experts are quite similar. 
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horizon (which is the whole point of this inquiry, of course).  The 
Daubert criteria are useful starting points, but that is all, and they are 
being supplemented by the lower courts as the common-law process 
works itself out, both with normal science and in other disciplines as 
well.  Here the adversary system has an important role to play.  It is 
not the judge’s obligation to engage in his or her own free-standing 
romp through the foundations of disciplines but instead to adhere 
largely to what the parties produce.  The proffering party must 
provide enough to establish the foundations of expert testimony, in 
the light of any contrary evidence produced by the opponent.29 
One last point.  There is considerable consternation in some 
areas of the academy today over whether the trial courts are holding 
expert testimony to too high a hurdle for admission, and largely 
making sufficiency holdings in the guise of admissibility holdings.  
Unless the educational function is extended beyond the trial judges 
to the juries, this is inevitable.  If expert evidence is both 
incomprehensible to jurors and insufficient to justify a verdict, it 
cannot rationally inform a jury’s deliberations, for deference to it 
would be by definition irrational even if it resulted in an accurate 
outcome.30  In such cases, submission of the evidence is pointless, for 
a verdict based on it would have to be rejected by the trial court.  Or 
so it is likely to appear to trial courts.  This means that the 
incremental educational function of interesting but not terribly well-
validated studies will be unobtainable at trial, a process possibly 
 
 29 This is why Professor Moreno’s concern may be misplaced that a “global” 
appraisal of fields “seems to distort the admissibility decision by forcing the judge to 
focus on a potentially infinite amount of evidence that is probably irrelevant to the 
dispute at hand.”  Moreno, supra note 2, at 1053. 
There is another concern about the adversary system—whether the demands of 
the Supreme Court cases will result in litigation-generated funding of research to 
create peer reviewed articles that reach the proper conclusion, and so on.  The Ninth 
Circuit in the Daubert remand opined that litigation-generated evidence should be 
viewed skeptically.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  For a general review of the problem, equally skeptical, see William L. 
Anderson et al., Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 619 (2001). 
 30 Consider, for example, Professor Moreno’s argument that 
Daubert’s underlying rationale is a sound one . . . [if] . . . the trial judge 
is more knowledgeable in assessing complex scientific testimony than is 
the average lay juror, and . . . each judge brings to the specific task of 
gatekeeping a general attitude or philosophy concerning the level of 
scrutiny appropriate for scientific gatekeepers. 
Moreno, supra note 2, at 1042 (quoting Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate: The 
Evolving Role of the Judiciary in Admitting Scientific Evidence, 83 JUDICATURE 140, 143 
(1999)).  Even if these conditions are true, if the jury does not understand the 
evidence, its effect can be entirely irrational.  There is no necessary or even obvious 
relationship between judicial gatekeeping and rational outcomes without education. 
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evident in the trial (and appellate) judges’ decisions.31  The 
proponents of looser standards of admissibility have failed to see, I 
think, that the solution to this problem is to embrace education with 
a vengeance.  If the mildly supportive data of, say, the effects of 
parlodel, can be understood, the basis for objecting to admission is 
removed, and whatever incremental inferential effect the data may 
have can occur.  Of course, it is a different matter if the reason for 
rejecting an educational approach is that a truly educated person 
would see that what is being offered is junk.  If that is the case, 
however, the evidence should not be admitted if the desideratum is 
accurate outcomes arrived at rationally and deliberately.  If the goal is 




 31 Bendictin and parlodel are good examples, perhaps. 
